“The use of violence can never be legitimate.” Discuss the validity of this claim, with reference to at least one violent conflict you have studied.
Legitimacy refers to groups or actions that are generally considered acceptable, usually by conforming to agreed laws or norms. While the definition of this complex term is straightforward, its applicability is often contentious – can violence be legitimate? In this essay, I will discuss the validity of the claim, “the use of violence can never be legitimate”, through a detailed analysis of the Libya Crisis (2011), War on Terror and relevant conflict theories (i.e. Just War Theory).
Firstly, I would like to introduce Just War Theory as a theory promulgating that violence and conflict can be both moral and legitimate as long as the act of conflict fulfils the following criteria: it comes from the Right Authority (i.e. the basis for the action is legitimate), the act is following a Just Cause (e.g. it may be in retaliation or a preemptive strike), the action is Proportional to the incoming/received threat, the Probability of Success is high and that the use of violence is the Last Resort. This theory is often associated with the political theory of Realism and subsequent theories of Offensive and Defensive Realism (key thinker: John Mearsheimer) as it justifies the use of hard power (hard power is defined as the use of coercion and force in order to achieve one’s aims) in conflict. Furthermore, Just War Theory also aligns itself with elements of Political Liberalism as both advocate for the exhaustion of all other soft power mechanisms before resorting to violence.
The Libya Crisis of 2011 occurred due to the first prerequisite of Just War Theory: Right Authority. Due to the Libyan Civil War, it was perceived that Gaddafi’s government was failing to comply with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework – an international human rights framework regarding upholding human rights during periods of conflict by enabling international intervention when a state is unable to protect crimes against humanity, war crimes and/or genocide from occurring within their borders. This agreement stems from the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, an event which occurred due to the failure of the international community, and has enabled military intervention in more than 100 different contemporary conflicts since. Following the perceived violation of R2P, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution #1973 enabled the international community to use “whatever means necessary” to prevent the harm of civilians in Libya. The actions of the international community and subsequent military power exertion by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was deemed legitimate as it came from legally binding international law (i.e. UNSC resolutions and the R2P). Thus, NATO employed a series of airstrikes and military operations to bring peace to the region of Libya. Although this action stemmed from the Right Authority, the Libya intervention is still largely contested due to the Just Cause and Proportionality clauses of Just War Theory as many political thinkers speculate that the United States of America (USA)’s involvement was driven by an illiberal mindset and ulterior motives. It was well known that Gadaffi held a strong anti-American/Western political position when it came to exporting natural commodities such as oil. Moreover, the USA had actually also established AFRICOM (an organisation actively trying to diminish Gadaffi’s influence and secure American interests in Africa) and there were reports that American military forces were supporting the rebel groups and bombing Gadaffi’s military. It could be perceived as though the USA was pursuing its own self-interest, rather than promoting positive and negative peace in Libya through the use of violence.
Through the political perspective of Realism, what the USA had done in Libya – by pursuing their own selfish goals – is in line with our human nature of being competitive individuals driven by self-interest. However, these actions would deem the use of violence ‘illegitimate’ as it does not conform to the liberal goals of the United Nations (UN) nor was the military intervention for a Just Cause. Furthermore, it was difficult to determine whether the exertion of violence was indeed Proportional to the threat in Libya and whether it was used as a Last Resort. Time and time again, the USA has sacrificed liberal goals by pursuing their own selfish interests, as further exemplified by the War on Terror.
According to the UN Charter Article #51, states may retaliate or take precautionary measures when under threat – for example, the United Kingdom’s September 2014 parliamentary vote authorised military action against ISIS following threats. Thus the initial action of the USA by initiating the War on Terror in response to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center was justified. However, the subsequent 15+ year-long war and military activity in Afghanistan cannot be deemed legitimate – the USA effectively rendered Afghanistan a ‘failed state’ and expended over $1.6 trillion USD. The War on Terror was not Proportional nor was it the Last Resort: it was observed by politicians that the USA refused to concede, compromise or engage in discussion with the Taliban (and vice versa), and instead resorted to violence. The entirety of the USA’s actions in Afghanistan are not wholly legitimate as it has not complied with the entirety of Just War Theory, nor did the US follow the liberal ideology of exhausting soft power before resorting to hard, military power.
From these two case studies of violent conflict, we can begin to see the trend that although violence could be theoretically justified, it is largely impossible for violence to be practically legitimate. The international intervention in Libya along with the War on Terror were both arguably driven by a realist, selfish perspective and disregarded multiple clauses of Just War Theory and the UN’s liberal mission of pursuing internationally beneficial goals through non-violent means. Moreover, we have to consider the implications of justifying and validating violent conflicts which are driven by self-interest: the entire premise of the UN would become compromised as states would begin engaging in violent conflicts and pursuing selfish goals at the expense of other political actors. The world would essentially mirror what John Mearsheimer asserts in his theory of Structural Realism: we live in an anarchic system and the principle goal of every state is to survive as states have ‘three forms of behaviour’, which are fear, self-help and seeking to maximise power. Because of this, our world reaches flashpoints and inevitable conflicts such as the Peloponnesian War and, more recently, the South China Sea conflict. This realist-driven political landscape is obviously not sustainable in the long run as selfish goals and illiberal mindsets gave rise to a multitude of conflicts, such as World Wars. Ever since the establishment of the UN Charter, we have not engaged in another World War – this must go to demonstrate that liberal ideologies of only exhausting violence when necessary in needed for global politics.
Thus, I conclude that although violence could be legitimate theoretically, the use of violence can never be practically legitimate as it seems that ulterior, selfish motives are always at hand when engaging in violent conflicts – violence is never used as a form of Justice, but rather as a means of punishment.