I disagree that emotions/preferences have no place in moral decision-making. Moral decision-making is deciding what’s right or wrong and then acting in accordance with the decision. Humans are social beings and have relationships. To sustain these relationships, we use empathy and compassion for one another to shape moral decisions. We prioritise people in our relationships to prevent alienation – therefore, emotions and preferences do impact moral decision-making.
Society consists of relations: for example, we enter into familial ones upon birth and economic ones upon employment. Not being in a relationship results in societal alienation. So, it’s a necessity (for wellbeing) to form relations. With human relationships comes ‘care’ as we need to prove our compassion to other people in our relationships to sustain the relationships. Relational sustenance is done through emotion: we need empathy, willingness to listen and human compassion – we need to make decisions based on the well-being of those we care about. An example of this idea is: your friend’s ex-boyfriend calls you asking where she is. He has a history of aggravated-assault and is intoxicated. You know exactly where she is but the two of them had a violent, bitter relationship so you refuse to follow objective moral reasoning (ie. the moral law of telling the truth) and lie about her whereabouts because you care for her. This shows that our care for one another makes objective moral laws malleable. My approach is supported by the Ethics of Care which dictates that we have to make decisions appealing to the dynamic of the people involved in the relationships. Moral rules are flexible under this theory as moral reasoning is a “process of deliberation and appropriate feeling developing out of our capacity to care” (Ethics of Care Worksheet – Althea Besa): this shows that our feelings and preferences must be taken into account when making moral decisions as our moral responsibilities to others are the most important moral considerations.
However, Ethics of Care cannot be penultimate in moral decision-making as it creates bias and it makes moral rules flexible. For example, you see your friend commit a hit-and-run but he doesn’t turn himself in. Would you turn him in? Using Ethics of Care, you would not as you have a bias and responsibility to act in his self-interest but is this ethical? This is a grave injustice as your friend is a danger to society but you exonerated him: you made him an exception to society’s moral and legal rules. He violated the maxim of not harming others; thus, he should face consequences but the Ethics of Care wouldn’t permit this as we prioritise relationships over the law. This is why critiquing this theory is imperative to reduce injustice and bias. The Ethics of Justice is a more objective theory, stating that everyone should be treated with equal respect and concern. Thus, eliminating elements of contextualism and bias by imparting inflexible and impartial moral rules. By finding a balance between the Ethics of Justice and Care, we can find a theory which is both subjective and objective: reducing the importance of “our deepest involvements and commitments” (Ethics of Care Worksheet – Althea Besa) but also emphasising our care for one another.
Another theory supporting my view is Moral Obligation theory; specifically, the social-contract view on moral obligations. Jean-Jacques Rousseau said “man is born free, but he is everywhere in chains” because once we enter into relations, our will becomes bound due to the social-contract – his idea that we have moral obligations to follow norms/moral laws supported by the general public. Our social nature forces us into civil society and emotional relations. Everyone is vulnerable but we don’t want to be, therefore establishing a moral imperative to maintain relations as relationships are “continual source(s) of value” (Moral Obligations PPT – Althea Besa). If relationships create moral obligations, then, through hypothetical syllogism, our refusal to be vulnerable creates moral imperatives to follow moral obligations. It’s deemed a ‘moral necessity’ – by our conscience – to follow obligations as they are “the deepest commitments” we have (Moral Obligations PPT – Dwight Furrow). This and Ethics of Care overlap but they have different scopes. Moral-Obligation theory is holistic: it states we are obliged to people through the Ethics of Care but we also have to accommodate our social-contract with people/things we aren’t close with. This is different from Ethics of Care which says we should only focus on responding to particular individuals in our relationships. Moral-Obligation theory forces us to evaluate decisions through the scope of emotions/preferences of all to ensure that our decisions don’t harm anyone/anything in the world. For example, Greenpeace aims to “ensure the ability of the earth to nurture life in all its diversity” (Greenpeace International). Their employees act on obligations to the environment and world (non-human entities), helping people/things that they aren’t individually connected to. Human Rights activists don’t have direct/individual relations with each person/entity they’re helping but feel a sense of injustice and oblige to the social-contract’s plight for equality. Our emotional connection to groups of people and non-human entities influence our moral decision-making, creating an ‘Ethics of Care’ for all, not just those we have individual relations with.
However, following obligations doesn’t necessarily make you good. Some obligations yield unethical actions (eg. your despairing friend tells you to rob a bank because it’s the only thing which will cheer them up) so this needs amending. Emotions are necessary for us in moral decisions as we cannot reason purely objectively – Objective Moral Reasoning is flawed as it doesn’t take context into account before making moral judgements (eg. Objective-Moral-Reasoning would delegate the same amount of moral guilt to a person who murdered in self-defence as to a serial killer) – but we must be wary of too much subjectivity as this may result in an inconsistent egoism/personal-relativism. Relational moral-obligation can be balanced using Objective Moral Authority – the other variation of Moral-Obligation – which focuses on impartiality as logical necessities should also be translated into moral necessities. It could also be balanced with R.M. Hare’s Preference Utilitarianism: utilitarianism which is concerned with everyone’s preferences in order to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number. Providing an objective/inflexible framework to Moral-Obligation theory could remedy the flaws and prevent immoral deeds being committed in the name of ‘moral-obligation’ but still gives leeway for the role of emotion to sustain relationships.
Ethics of Care and Moral-Obligation theory are similar with the exception that Moral-Obligation theory takes a holistic scope when making moral decisions. It explores the idea that our relationships with the entire world bind our will as we make emotionally-driven ethical decisions favouring those in our all relationships so that we are not vulnerable.
So, does emotion have a place in moral decision-making? Yes. I believe that [relational] Moral–Obligation theory exemplifies the necessity of emotion in sustaining relations. Emotional decision-making may cloud our judgement, but we have to recognise the Joker’s quote: “we live in a society.” With society comes relations: without relations, we are vulnerable so, even if it’s undesirable, we have to work towards sustaining relations through obligations to one another. We must involve emotion in moral decision-making.